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Because o f the gravity o f the Chief Accountant's remarks—independence and objectivity
are the raison d'etre o f the auditor—and its own professed concerns, the Board decided to
appoint an Advisory Panel on Auditor Independence to assess the dimensions o f the
problem and recommend steps to bolster the professionalism o f the independent auditor and
to assess the working relationships among the profession, the SEC, and the FASB.
The persons asked to undertake this task were;
D onald J. Kirk, a founding member o f the Financial Accounting Standards Board
who served for 14 years, 9 as chairman; presently a professor at the Columbia
University Graduate School o f Business and a member o f the boards o f directors
and audit committees o f several large enterprises; and earlier a partner o f a major
accounting firm. Mr. Kirk served as chairman o f the Advisory Panel.
George D. Anderson, founder and retired head o f Anderson ZurMuehlen & Co., a
distinguished accounting firm in Helena, Montana; former chairman o f the American
Institute o f CPAs; and a recognized leader o f the accounting profession.
Ralph S. Saul, formerly director o f the SEC's Division o f Trading and Markets and
associate director o f the SEC's Special Study o f the Securities Markets; president o f
the American Stock Exchange and chief executive off i cer o f CIGNA Corp.; and
presently a director and audit committee member o f several companies.
The Advisory Panel spent six months interviewing 77 professionals, business executives,
attorneys, academics, and others who they thought could contribute to their inquiry. They
reviewed 22 written submissions that they received in response to their requests, as well as
numerous other reports and studies.
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The Public Oversight Board is an independent, private secto r b o d y that monitors an d
reports on the self-regulatory program s a n d activities o f the SEC Practice Section o f the
Division for CPA Firms o f the Am erican Institute o f Certified Public Accountants.
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The Panel's report, which accompanies this letter, has been reviewed carefully by the Public
Oversight Board. The Board believes it is an outstanding description o f t h e most critical
problems confronting the accounting profession and o f related corporate governance issues.
The Board believes that the report's conclusions are sound and must be heeded to avoid a
further deterioration o f confidence in the accounting profession and in the integrity o f the
financial information on which our economic system relies.
The report urges the accounting profession to look to the board o f directors—the
shareholders' representative—as the audit client, not corporate management. It calls for a
direct interfa ce between the entire board and the auditor at least annually, and an expanded
interfa ce with the audit committee.
To increase the value o f the audit, the Advisory Panel calls for a new level o f candor from
the auditor. Auditors would not only apprise the board o f what is acceptable accounting,
they would be expected to express their views, as accounting experts, on the
appropriateness o f the accounting principles used or proposed by the company, the clarity
o f its financial disclosures, and the degree o f aggressiveness or conservatism o f the
accounting principles and underlying estimates reflected in the company's financial
statements.
That expansion o f the auditor's responsibilities is a fa r-reaching, perhaps revolutionary,
proposal, one that is responsive to complaints about "lowest common denominator"
accounting principles often applied with "rose colored glasses."
These and the other important conclusions o f the Panel, including those aimed at improving
the relationships among the accounting profession, the SEC, and accounting standard
setters deserve the careful study o f all concerned with the integrity o f financial reporting,
auditing, and corporate governance processes in this country.
The report is a clear call for completion o f a process that has long been developing and that
has been presaged in reports o f the Cohen Commission (1978) and the Treadway
Commission (1987), among others. In it lies the hope for more credible, relevant, and
meaningful financial information
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STRENGTHENING THE PROFESSIONALISM
OF THE INDEPENDENT AUDITOR

I. PREFACE
In February 1994, the Public Oversight Board (POB) o f the SEC Practice Section
(SECPS) o f the American Institute o f Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) appointed a
three-member Advisory Panel on Auditor Independence. The POB charged the Advisory
Panel to determine whether;
the SEC Practice Section, the accounting profession or the SEC should take
steps to better assure the independence o f auditors and the integrity and
objectivity of their judgments on the appropriate application o f generally
accepted accounting principles to financial statements.
The Panel’s observations and suggestions on those matters are set forth in this report.

M EMBERS OF THE ADVISORY PANEL ON AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE

Donald J. Kirk, Chairman

George D. Anderson
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II. INTRODUCTION

Background
In March 1993, the POB published a comprehensive Special Report, In the Public
Interest: Issues Confronting the Accounting Profession. That report contained 25
recommendations o f specific actions to enhance the usefulness and reliability o f financial
statements, strengthen the performance and professionalism o f the public accounting
profession, including the ability o f auditors to detect fr aud and illegalities, and improve
self-regulation.
In Chapter V o f the Special Report, the POB expressed concern that the profession’s
objectivity, independence, and public responsibility would be compromised if, in the
pursuit o f client service, audit firms became advocates o f their clients’ positions in
financial reporting matters.
That concern resulted in the POB making three
recommendations (V-3, V-4, and V-5) aimed at strengthening independence and
professionalism and six others (V-6 through V-11) intended to improve financial reporting
and corporate governance. Those nine POB recommendations relate directly to the work
o f the Advisory Panel and are reproduced in Appendix A to this report.
In a speech on January 11, 1994, the Chief Accountant o f the SEC, Walter P. Schuetze,
questioned the independence o f accounting firms in situations in which they condoned or
advocated what he called “incredible” accounting practices or were unduly influenced by
client views in formulating positions on FASB proposals. The Panel’s appointment was
prompted by issues raised in that speech. Mr. Schuetze had made similar charges in an
August 1992 speech. (Our analysis o f the January 1994 speech is in Appendix B to this
report.) The timing o f Mr. Schuetze’s speech less than a year after the POB’s Special
Report suggests that, in the view o f the Chief Accountant o f the SEC, the public
accounting profession needs further examination.

The Panel’s Approach
In accepting their appointment, the Panel members understood that their charge
encompassed, but was not limited to, (1) assessing the working relationship among the
SEC, the FASB, the auditing profession, and the business community and (2) identifying
and evaluating steps to bolster the objectivity, independence, and professionalism o f
auditing firms.
Further, although the charge asks the Panel to identify steps that might be taken by three
specific groups—the SEC Practice Section o f the AICPA, the public accounting firms, and
the SEC— some o f the Panel’s suggestions are directed beyond those three groups to
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corporate boards o f directors and audit committees, corporate management, and the
FASB.
M any of the concerns th a t the Panel has heard d u rin g its exam ination of au d ito r
independence focus m ore on th e perceived lack o f objectivity of some auditors in
th e ir acquiescence, approval, an d even advocacy o f w h at critics believe to be
questionable o r inap p ro p riate accounting principles and practices o f their c lients.
Consequently, this R eport addresses questions ab o u t the integrity and objectivity o f
auditors to a greater extent th a n independence, although th e three concepts are
in te rre la te d Integrity is the basis for public tru st. It requires the au d ito r to be
honest and candid and never to su b o rd in ate principle o r professional judgm ent.
O bjectivity gives value to the a u d ito r’s services. I t requires the a u d ito r to be
im partial, intellectually honest, and free from conflicts of interest. Independence
requires an a u d ito r’s freedom from both th e fact and appearance of conflicts of
interest.
In preparing this Report the Panel members have read prior studies and reports on the role
o f the independent auditor, solicited written comments, and interviewed many
knowledgeable people, all identified in Appendix C. The Panel is indebted and grateful to
all who volunteered their help in the course o f this study.
The Panel has been ably assisted by Jerry D. Sullivan and Marcia E. Brown, Executive
Director and Administrative Manager, respectively, o f the Public Oversight Board, and by
Paul Pacter, Professor o f Accounting at the University o f Connecticut’s Stamford MBA
Program. However, the views expressed herein are solely those o f the Panel members.
The Panel has avoided the temptation to make a list o f detailed recommendations, in part
because o f the comprehensiveness o f the POB Special Report o f March 1993, and also
because the POB is better served by a less structured report. For those reasons, the
P anel’s re p o rt takes th e form of suggestions based on the num erous interviews the
Panel conducted and Panel m em bers’ personal experiences in the business
com m unity and in various aspects o f th e profession. W hile several of the Panel’s
suggestions are fairly specific, m ost are b ro ad in scope and intended to challenge
and stim ulate the profession an d o th er particip an ts in the financial reporting
process to consider the long-range fu tu re o f th e profession and ways to bolster th e
independent audit. While the Panel’s observations and suggestions have been discussed
in general terms with knowledgeable persons, this Report has not been exposed for
comment prior to its submission to the POB. The Panel anticipates that the POB will give
the suggestions in its report careful consideration before endorsing any o f them or
recommending any action to affected parties.
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III. THE PROFESSIONAL ENVIRONMENT
The independent audit fills an essential role for the investing public and creditors by
enhancing the reliability o f corporations’ published financial statements and giving
assurance o f that reliability to users o f those financial statements. Conscious o f its public
responsibility, the profession has devoted considerable time and money to improving its
performance as independent auditors. Over the past quarter century, numerous thoughtful
studies o f auditor performance have been conducted, many of which are listed in Appendix
C. Based on those studies, important and in some cases dramatic structural changes have
been made in the way professional standards are set and audits are conducted.
For many years, the profession has enjoyed public goodwill and confidence that remain its
greatest assets. However, as the 1993 P OB Special Report noted, public respect and
confidence are jeopardized if the profession’s integrity, objectivity, and independence are
questioned. Recently, widely publicized allegations o f audit failures and improper financial
practices by companies, particularly, although by no means exclusively, those related to
the “savings and loan crisis,” have eroded the profession’s goodwill and public confidence.
Those assets can be further dissipated if the profession’s audit services—the basis for its
fr anchise— do not meet the needs o f corporate boards, stockholders, creditors, and the
investing public. As the FOB Special Report stated, “attacks on the accounting profession
from a variety o f sources suggested a significant public concern with the profession’s
performance.”
The profession is at a critical juncture. Even though great strides have been made in
ensuring, through peer reviews, that the processes within firms' for conducting an audit are
o f high quality, there are serious issues that remain to be addressed.
New and complex business arrangements and financial transactions have complicated the
resolution o f accounting questions, challenged the validity o f old answers, and increased
the risks o f auditing. Audit risks also have increased because many industries are now
subject to less government regulation. Moreover, information technology has changed the
nature and complexity o f companies’ records and the speed and ease with which those
records are produced and changed. Business failures generate wide media attention,
litigation, enormous direct and indirect costs to taxpayers, and Congressional scrutiny o f
the accounting profession and standard setters. Fraudulent financial schemes, while rare,
understandably make bold headlines and erode public confidence in corporate financial
reporting.
The media, litigants, the Congress, and others often allege, rightly or wrongly, that audit
failures contributed to many business failures. In that context, the public views audit
failures as including not only the failure to discover and report material negative facts but
also the failure o f financial statements to serve as an adequate early-warning device for the
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protection o f investors and creditors. Questionable accounting principles1 or inadequate
disclosure are regarded as contributing to audit failures.
The cost o f real and perceived audit failures is immense. They have resulted in widespread
skepticism about the objectivity o f the profession even after the many steps taken to lessen
the “expectation gap.” They have also resulted in large monetary settlements and
judgments and related costs that have made the major accounting firms virtually
uninsurable. The risks associated with the auditing function have caused the major firms
to manage their exposure more aggressively, for example, by turning down high risk
clients and monitoring existing clients more closely. Those risks and competitive
pressures have also caused the large accounting firms to encourage detailed accounting
and auditing standards and clear guidance or consensus on how to apply them, thereby
narrowing the scope o f professional judgment that might be questioned by a litigant
alleging a loss due to a negligent audit. One consequence has been that audits have
become more compliance or rule-book oriented.
There seems to be a growing cynicism at the SEC about the performance o f the public
accounting profession. Perhaps as a result, the Commission’s staff has been less restrained
in bypassing established private-sector standard-setting mechanisms. The Commission’s
staff has used the registration process and the “bully pulpit” to identify what it believes are
acceptable or unacceptable accounting practices, short-cutting the work o f the FASB
Emerging Issues Task Force (EITF). Perhaps sensing the politicization o f the process for
setting accounting standards, the business community has responded with enhanced and,
at times, aggressive lobbying efforts for their preferred solutions with the FASB, with the
accounting firms, and in Washington.
All o f this has come at the same time as many o f the larger firms have combined, spread
out globally, and diversified the services offered to clients. Mergers, acquisitions, and
restructurings in corporate America have severely aggravated competition among the Big
6 for larger clients. Firms have also decried the quality o f undergraduate accounting
education and either have not been able or have not chosen to hire graduates o f traditional
MBA programs. Firms have watched the skills and intellect o f financial management staffs
o f some clients grow to rival those o f the engagement teams servicing the client.
During the past decade, the corporate community has increased its involvement in the
accounting standard-setting process. Many large companies now assign key people to
monitor and influence the work o f standard setters, particularly the FASB and the AICPA
Accounting Standards Executive Committee (AcSEC). As a result o f clients’ increasing
internal competence in accounting and auditing, the value o f the external audit as
perceived by corporate financial management is lessened, and the audit is sometimes
viewed and priced as a commodity. Some commentators to the Panel observed that
independent auditing has increasingly emphasized evidence-gathering and compliance with
rules and has left the judgments about accounting policies and disclosure practices largely
1In this report, accounting principles include not only broad guidelines of general application but also
detailed practices and procedures for implementing them.
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to corporate financial managers. Financial managers aggressively control audit activity
and costs and are in a position to orchestrate meetings o f the external auditor with the
audit committee and the full board o f directors.
While accounting and auditing remain at the heart o f public accounting firms’ practices,
the larger firms have become less reliant on revenues from this source and increasingly
depend on consulting and other services, which carry higher margins and less risk and are
more attractive to younger staff recruits. Studies show that the large public accounting
firms today earn only about half o f their revenue fr om auditing and accounting services,
and some considerably less. Five o f the top seven consulting firms in the United States
and six o f the top seven consulting firms worldwide are reported to be Big 6 firms. Some
o f the firms now think o f themselves not as accounting and auditing firms but as multi-line
professional service firms. Marketing materials and advertising present the firms to the
world as business consulting organizations, not as auditors.
Overall, the Panel sees the foregoing trends as reducing the stature o f the independent
audit at a time when public skepticism about the credibility and reliability o f corporate
financial information has increased. Those trends chip away at the objectivity o f the
auditor and the value o f the independent audit.
Strengthening the professionalism o f the auditor requires an environment in which boards
o f directors and management o f client companies have high expectations about the
auditing firms’ integrity, objectivity, and professional expertise and in which the auditor, in
meeting those obligations, recognizes an overriding public responsibility. It requires an
environment in which an auditor’s professional services truly do add value and are not
looked on simply as a regulatory requirement imposed on the company. It requires an
environment in which auditors can pursue their professional activities without undue fear
o f liability and in which government and regulators balance their responsibilities for
oversight against the need to let the profession function effectively in the private sector.
These requirements are interconnected, and the future o f the profession rests on coming to
grips with each o f them. However, there are no quick fixes— in the words o f the PO B’s
charge to the Panel— “to better assure the independence o f auditors and the integrity and
objectivity o f their judgments on the appropriate application o f generally accepted
accounting principles.”

IV.

THE PANEL’S OBSERVATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS

The Panel was appointed by the Public Oversight Board o f the AICPA’s SEC Practice
Section. Consequently, this report focuses on audits in the context o f public companies.
Nonetheless, many o f the Panel’s observations and suggestions are applicable more
broadly to the entire independent auditing function o f the public accounting profession.
An auditor’s integrity, objectivity, and independence should not depend on whether the
audit client’s securities are publicly traded.
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The Need for Additional Rules or Legislation on Auditor Independence
In March 1994, the staff o f the Office o f the Chief Accountant (OCA) o f the Securities
and Exchange Commission published a comprehensive S ta ff Report on Auditor
Independence. The OCA Report concludes:
The OCA believes that the combination o f the extensive systems o f
independence requirements issued by the Commission and the AICPA, coupled
with the Commission’s active enforcement program, provide to investors
reasonable safeguards against loss due to the conduct o f audits by accountants that
lack independence from their audit clients. The enactment o f detailed legislation or
the promulgation o f additional rules is not necessary.
The OCA believes that further legislation or fundamental changes in the
Commission’s regulations are not necessary at this time for the protection o f
investors. [page 55]
T he SEC and A ICPA independence rules an d in terp retatio n s focus on and guard
against relationships th a t create the fact o r perception o f a conflict of interests
between a u d ito r and client. T he Panel has found no evidence of a need for actions
by the SEC o r by the A ICPA to ad d to o r am end the extensive existing body of rules
and regulations relating to a u d ito r conflicts o f in te re st There is, of course, an
ongoing need to keep those rules and regulations up to d ate to reflect changes in the
business environm ent. The Panel also concurs w ith th e view of OCA th a t fu rth er
legislation is not necessary for protection o f investors.
The OCA Report discusses whether the SEC should adopt a rule mandating periodic
rotation o f accounting firms conducting the audits o f the financial statements o f public
companies. The OCA staff concludes that the Cohen Commission finding that the cost o f
mandatory rotation would exceed the benefits is still valid. The OCA Report states that
“[t]he SECPS requirement for a periodic change in the engagement partner... when
coupled with the... second partner review” is effective and that “a well-informed,
independent audit committee may be in the best position to decide when the benefits o f a
change in auditors outweigh the costs” (page 54). It also should be noted that the SECPS
recently reconsidered the mandatory rotation question and, in March 1992, issued a
report, Statem ent o f Position regarding M andatory Rotation o f A udit Firms o f Publicly
H eld Companies, making a case in opposition to mandatory rotation. The Panel concurs
w ith the conclusions of the C ohen Commission, OCA, and SECPS reports th a t a
rule m andating the rotation of a u d it firm s is im practical and not needed because of
the significant costs and questionable benefits and because o f other safeguards
presently in place, such as p a rtn e r ro tatio n an d second-partner review.
The OCA Report also discusses whether the performance o f management advisory
services (MAS) by auditors has an impact on auditor independence. After analyzing the
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nature and magnitude o f such services performed by the firms, the Report concludes that
“the lack o f an apparent, dramatic increase in MAS provided to SEC audit clients,
however, suggests that a fundamental change in the Commission’s regulations is not
necessary at this time” (page 34).
The Panel was not specifically charged with assessing the appropriateness o f non-audit
services offered by firms. Those services and their impact on firms’ independence have
been the subject o f many earlier studies. A report prepared by the Big 6 accounting firms,
“The Public Accounting Profession; Meeting the Needs o f a Changing World” (January
1991), suggested a new rf amework for defining independence. That proposed framework,
which was rejected by the SEC staff and not adopted by the profession, downplayed
concerns about the appearance o f conflicts o f interest in arrangements with clients. For
example, the report stated; “Business relationships between public accountants and audit
clients do not impair independence as long as they result from the ordinary course o f
business and are not material to either party.” That position fails to recognize the special
responsibilities o f the independent auditor and the importance o f avoiding the appearance
o f a conflict o f interest. The position o f the Big 6 firms in that report was that “all
services delivered under the umbrella o f a public accounting firm are subject to the same
high professional standards o f objectivity, integrity, competence and due professional care
required o f audit services.” However, the public responsibilities o f the independent
auditor hold the independent audit to an even higher standard.
While the existing conflict-of-interest rules and the various mechanisms for
improving those rules are appropriate and adequate, there are important steps that
should be taken in other ways to enhance the objectivity and strengthen the
professionalism of independent auditors. The balance of this report sets forth the
Panel’s suggestions for achieving those goals.

Independent Auditing Imposes Special Responsibilities
on Accounting Firms
The Role of Auditing in Public Accounting Firms
In U nited States v. A rthur Young & Co.2 the Supreme Court o f the United States
described the independent audit as a “public watchdog” function and noted that “if
investors were to view the auditor as an advocate for the corporate client, the value o f the
audit might well be lost.” The growing trend to view client service as the objective o f all
firm activities runs the risk o f failing to recognize the unique responsibility that attaches to
the audit function. Client service can easily be equated with serving the management o f
the corporate client, for example by searching for imaginative analogies to get an
accounting result desired by the management. The Panel recognizes that the AICPA’s
Code o f Conduct expects CPAs to “serve the public interest,” “honor the public trust,”
2United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805 (1984).
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and be objective in all their activities. Therefore, Arms need to em phasize to all
professional staff, m any of whom are not yet CPAs and m ay not have read th e Code,
th a t auditing is not ju s t one of m any services offered to clients. I t is special. It
involves a "p u b lic responsibility transcending any employm ent relationship w ith the
client.”
The Panel finds worrisome the trend o f accounting firms, in wanting to grow, to add or
expand nonaudit services and thereby reduce their reliance on and the relative importance
o f auditing. The increasing fact and threat o f litigation in the absence o f meaningful tort
reform, along with competition and fee-cutting, have made auditing less and less
financially attractive. Auditing is also beset by such personnel issues as a declining
percentage o f the best and brightest college graduates going into the accounting
profession and the unattractiveness o f beginning assignments in audit activity.
Growing reliance on nonaudit services has the potential to compromise the objectivity or
independence o f the auditor by diverting firm leadership away fr om the public
responsibility associated with the independent audit function, by allocating
disproportionate resources to other lines o f business within the firm, and by seeing the
audit function as necessary just to get the benefit o f being considered objective and to
serve as an entree to sell other services.
Further, by creating specialties along industry lines, large firms have sought to be in a
better position to market their services to potential clients and to audit existing clients
more effectively. However, industry specialization has a downside. It may result in a loss
o f objectivity if the specialists get so close to the industry that they fail to challenge
industry practices that fall short o f providing the most relevant and reliable accounting
information. The Panel believes that, in addition to the more focused industry expertise,
the accounting and auditing judgments that arise in audit engagements require that broader
expertise be brought to bear, for example, through consultation with the accounting firm’s
national technical office.
T he independent auditing firms need to focus on how the au d it function can be
enhanced and not subm erged in large multi-line public accounting/m anagem ent
consulting firms. To do th a t m ay require th a t firm s’ senior m anagem ent reth in k
th e ir organization structures and business strategies. The regulators and overseers
of the accounting profession should support the profession’s efforts in this regard.
O rganization of the Firm s’ Technical A ccounting Functions
Two o f the principal functions o f an auditing firm’s technical accounting office are to
respond to accounting questions fr om client service personnel and to develop firm
positions on accounting questions under consideration by the FASB, the SEC, or other
accounting standards bodies or professional committees.
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Internal Consultations
In its 1993 Special Report, the POB found in their review o f alleged audit failures that “in
too many cases, however, the preference o f client management— influenced at least in part
by objectives other than producing the most reliable financial reporting possible in the
circumstances— nevertheless prevailed over the preference o f the auditing or consulting
partner.”
Firms have tightened internal controls over technical accounting advice given to practice
office partners. While no single form o f structure or process is necessarily suitable for all
firms, the objective in all cases should be a coordinated system that insures that disparate
answers are not given to similar questions and that internal consultations take place on
troublesome questions.
The importance o f firms’ internal consultation procedures is underscored in the following
communication distributed to partners by the Senior Partner o f Price Waterhouse:
Part o f my job as Senior Partner is to get involved when some sort o f
serious client service issue arises, and, lately, I’ve become involved in several
troublesome situations where we’ve strayed down a path thought to be that of
responsive client service. So let me briefly re-emphasize what outstanding client
service is not.
Clients can and do become aggressive and demanding about wanting us to
approve a particular treatment. But outstanding client service does not mean
stretching rules beyond sound professional practice to satisfy a client whim—for,
often, this leads to future problems for the client and the firm. It does not mean
compromising our credibility with the SEC, IRS, or other regulatory bodies by
championing a questionable client proposal that goes beyond the bounds o f sound,
reasonable practice. It does not mean going along with a client’s too aggressive
stance in an audit situation, rationalizing that there’s an offsetting item elsewhere
in the accounts; going way out on a limb in approving a tax treatment in order to
please a client for the moment; bending too far in supporting a client’s
argument5—or its attorney—in a DA&CR [dispute analysis and corporate
recovery] engagement; or cutting comers in a consulting engagement to meet
unrealistic deadlines or budgets. Such activities not only demean us professionally,
they really don’t help the client, and certainly not the firm, in the long run.
I know how tough it can be out there. That’s why we need to share the
tough decisions with each other. In addition to easing the pressure on us as
individuals, it makes it easier for us to arrive at the best professional decision. So
as I’ve said many times before: D on’t feel you have to go it alone— consult with
your partners when you’re confronting those tough calls.
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Public accounting firms should adopt m echanism s th a t ensure th a t (1) th e ir national
technical offices are independent of practice p artn ers who feel the direct pressure
from client companies; (2) th e stan d a rd to w hich th e national technical office
personnel should be held in advising engagem ent p artn ers is not ju s t "w h a t
practices are acceptable” b u t "w h a t is th e m ost a p p ro p riate accounting in the
circum stance;” (3) client accounting positions a re not b rought before the SEC until
th a t consultation has taken place; an d (4) full inform ation ab o u t th e facts and
circum stances has been m ade available to th e national technical office.
The importance o f internal consultation on accounting matters was recognized by the POB
in their recommendations V-5, V-7, and V-8. The Panel concurs with the thrust o f those
recommendations and has more to say, later in this report, on the subject o f the
appropriateness o f accounting choices and accounting estimates.
Submissions to the FASB and the SEC
All o f the large public accounting firms participate actively in the development o f
accounting standards, and all have adopted internal procedures for reaching positions
taken in submissions to the FASB and the SEC. At the same time, the business
community, The Business Roundtable, and other industry associations have become
increasingly organized and effective in lobbying the standard setters and their auditors.
Developing positions for submission to th e FASB, the SEC, and AcSEC is p a rt of an
accounting firm ’s public responsibility. Therefore, it is essential th a t the firm ’s
intern al organization and processes for developing those positions be insulated from
u n due pressure from o r on behalf o f clients. In addition, com m unications about
firm positions on FASB proposals m ust be done in a judicious, professional way th a t
does not a p p ea r to curry favor w ith clients o r ap p ea r to be p a rt of an organized
cam paign. C lient-related m otivations, o r even the appearance thereof, in reaching
o r com m unicating accounting policy decisions can contribute to a decline in the
integrity, objectivity, and professionalism of public accounting firms and in public
respect for the profession. More is said on this subject later in this report under the
heading o f “Responsibilities o f Accounting Firms in the Standard-Setting Process.”
POB Recommendations V-3, V-4, and V-5 address matters o f client advocacy and
recognize that special care is needed to ensure that accounting firms’ “participation in the
standard setting process is characterized by objectivity and professionalism.” The Panel
endorses those recommendations and strongly supports the PO B’s suggestion that
standard setters and leaders o f the profession regularly discuss issues related to client
advocacy.
Accounting firms should give careful thought to their policies and procedures for
participating in the establishment o f professional standards. In that regard, the Panel
commends an approach similar to that expressed by Deloitte & Touche;

11

...We weigh the issues and alternatives and form our conclusions about the
potential effectiveness o f proposed standards in improving the relevance and
reliability o f financial reporting. In evaluating input received from clients and
others, we recognize that virtually every proposed professional standard will be
perceived negatively by some clients and that many proposed standards will be
viewed favorably by some clients and negatively by others. While it is important to
understand the basis for concerns others may have about a proposed standard, and
to give appropriate thought to those views, our positions reflect the independent
view o f our Firm and not merely a consensus o f the views o f many diverse
interests.
There are different ways to translate that type o f policy into action. Arthur Andersen &
Co., for example, has had a recognized tradition o f developing a consistent and wellregarded body o f firm-wide professional positions along with the courage to defend those
positions even if they are unpopular. Some attribute that tradition to the firm’s own
“conceptual fr amework” o f financial reporting. Others cite a “tone at the top”— a
willingness to defend what the firm believes is the best answer for users o f financial
statements even in the face o f organized preparer opposition. Whatever the cause, the
result is worthy o f emulation.
The Panel recognizes that the SECPS peer-review process expressly includes a review o f
the firm’s internal controls over its technical accounting consultation function. A firm’s
process for developing firm positions on technical accounting and auditing standards
matters is more difficult to review. The POB and the SECPS should consider whether the
PO B’s oversight or the peer review process can be strengthened in this regard. T hrough
its oversight of the peer review process, th e PO B should identify effective policies
and procedures th a t accounting firms have adopted for internal technical
consultation, for providing technical guidance to professional staff, and for
developing firm positions on technical standards. The PO B should encourage
adoption of those " best practices.”

Strengthening the Relationship Between the
Board of Directors and the Independent Auditor
Responsibilities of B oards o f D irectors
One important result o f the litigation stemming fr om the corporate takeovers and business
failures o f the 1980s has been the rise in power o f corporate boards o f directors and a
growing recognition by large institutional shareholders o f their obligation (and power) to
monitor diligently the performance o f boards o f directors as the shareholders’ elected
representatives. Judicial decisions were the principal catalyst for those changes, with
added impetus from several legislative and regulatory initiatives. Over the past decade,
the dominance o f the process o f corporate governance by management has ebbed as
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boards o f directors have assumed the long-acknowledged but seldom-practiced role as
“the fulcrum o f accountability” in the corporate governance system.
Ira Millstein (Senior Partner at the law firm o f Weil, Gotshal & Manges and a nationally
recognized expert on corporate governance) has described the new challenge to the board
under the evolving governance system as follows:
The board’s challenge is to stay sufficiently informed o f current
performance, to be concerned with the future o f even apparently great companies,
to know when it is time to change, and to be sufficiently independent to make the
change.
Additionally, CEOs should recognize that the best defense against
shareholder misunderstanding—which today is a serious threat to a CEO’s
tenure— is the existence o f a strong independent board. This board must be in a
position to “certify” to shareholders— especially institutional shareholders— that
the CEO is evaluated regularly, and is doing what the board expects, according to
a strategic plan agreed to in advance by the board and the CEO.
A similar point o f view has been expressed by Martin Lipton (Partner at the law firm o f
Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz) and Jay W. Lorsch (Senior Associate Dean o f the
Graduate School o f Business Administration, Harvard University), also nationally
recognized experts in corporate governance:
Corporate governance in the United States is not working the way it
should. The problem is not the system o f laws, regulations, and judicial decisions
which are the fr amework o f corporate governance. It is the failure by too many
boards o f directors to make the system work the way it should....
This state o f affairs suggests clearly to us that more effective corporate
governance depends vitally on strengthening the role o f the board o f directors.
Lipton and Lorsch cite lack o f time, unwieldy board size, complexity o f information, lack
o f cohesiveness, the power of top management, and confused accountabilities as the
principal “constraints on the board’s role as an effective monitor.” They make a number
o f proposals that companies could adopt unilaterally and in their own self-interest, without
regulation or legislation, including a ratio o f at least two outside directors for each
management director, reduced board size, increased frequency and duration o f meetings,
improved information, a program for regular evaluation o f corporate performance and that
o f the CEO, and regular meetings with groups o f institutional shareholders. All o f those
recommendations are intended to strengthen the accountability o f the board to the
shareholders.
In some companies, the chairman o f the board o f directors is an independent
nonmanagement director. In most companies, though, the chairman is also the chief
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executive officer of the company, a member o f management. Two evolving trends in the
governance o f companies whose board chairman is also the CEO are (1) more frequent
meetings o f the outside directors without the presence o f any insiders and (2) the
identification o f an outside director as “lead director”— to serve as the leader o f the
outside directors and as their liaison with the CEO on matters in which the outside
directors may have a special interest, such as what information the outside directors
receive and the agenda o f board meetings. The Panel endorses the lead-director idea not
only to bolster independence o f directors and board committees but also to provide a link
between the independent auditor and the outside directors on matters that the auditor
believes should be considered by a larger group o f nonmanagement directors than only
those serving on the audit committee. Strengthening the independence o f the outside
directors should reinforce the objectivity and independence o f the auditor.
The Panel urges the Public Oversight Board, the SEC, and others to encourage the
adoption o f proposals, such as those cited above, to enhance the independence of
boards of directors and their accountability to shareholders. Stronger, more
accountable boards will strengthen the professionalism o f the outside auditor,
enhance the value of the independent audit, and serve the investing public.
Role o f the Board and Its Audit Committee
Today, in most companies, the auditor’s interaction with the board o f directors is through
the board’s audit committee. The audit committee assists the board in fulfilling its
oversight responsibilities in the areas o f financial reporting, internal controls, financial
policies, and the independent and internal audit processes. While it is certainly appropriate
and effective for the board to delegate those responsibilities to the audit committee, the
Panel believes that the auditors can add to the effectiveness o f the board in monitoring
corporate performance on behalf o f the shareholders without detracting fr om the
important role o f audit committees by direct involvement with the full board and
particularly its independent directors.
The importance o f the role o f audit committees is well documented. For over 50 years,
the SEC has recommended that companies form audit committees o f independent
directors— a recommendation that the Panel believes is even more important today. The
SEC strengthened that recommendation during the 1970s with required disclosure in
proxy materials o f the existence, composition, and responsibilities o f those committees. A
number o f “blue ribbon” studies not only in the United States but also in Canada and the
United Kingdom have made recommendations to strengthen the functioning o f audit
committees. And the POB Special Report made three specific recommendations with
respect to audit committees (recommendations V-9, V-10, and V-11, set forth in
Appendix A).
A comprehensive study, Im proving Audit Committee Performance: What Works Best,
that was prepared last year for the Institute o f Internal Auditors, identified organizational
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and operating practices that enable audit committees to function more effectively. The
study noted:
Highly publicized frauds and business failures involving the culpability o f
executive management have raised questions about the adequacy o f corporate
governance. The credibility o f financial reporting is also being questioned. It is
important for all parties involved in the financial reporting process to help close the
credibility gap by reexamining their roles in the process. Audit committees play a
key role in assuring the credibility o f financial reporting by providing, on behalf o f
the board o f directors, oversight o f the financial reporting process as well as
internal controls. It is vital, therefore, that they function effectively. [page 1]

The report notes that the effectiveness o f audit committees is affected, first and foremost,
by the expertise o f members o f audit committees in the areas o f accounting and financial
reporting, internal controls, and auditing:
The single most important finding, and the key to audit committee
effectiveness, is background information and training. Audit committee members
must be provided with more background and training to enable them to be more
effective.
Management, internal auditors, and independent accountants are
identified as sources o f this information. [page 2]
The Panel recognizes that time availability and committee members’ backgrounds
constrain what an audit committee can do. For that reason, the Panel would not
encourage that specific responsibilities be placed on audit committees through legislation
or regu lation (such as the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act o f
19913 or the legislation recently proposed that would establish audit committee
responsibility to investigate financial derivatives transactions). Legislated responsibilities
would tend to make the audit committee compliance-oriented rather than shareholderoriented. Instead of legislating how a u d it committees should function, th e Panel
w ould place responsibility on the independent au d ito r to be m ore forthcom ing in
com m unicating first w ith the a u d it com m ittee and then w ith the full board.
The Panel believes it essential that the full board and particularly the independent directors
have more exposure to the outside auditor to assist the board in meeting its responsibilities
to shareholders. The independent auditor can provide the board a wide and objective

3The Panel finds troublesome certain provisions of that Act that impose specific auditing and reporting
procedures on independent auditors of insured banks and impose specific duties on audit committees. The
Panel acknowledges that those provisions of the law were well intentioned but is concerned that imposing
auditing and reporting procedures and board responsibilities by law can undermine the professionalism
and independent judgments of outside auditors and boards of directors by making the audit function
compliance oriented. The Panel is also concerned that this might be “the camel’s nose under the tent”
with regard to legislating auditing and reporting procedures and board responsibilities.
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perspective o f the company’s operations as well as its financial reporting policies and
practices.
As the shareholders’ representative, the board is accountable to them for
m onitoring the com pany’s perform ance in achieving its goals and plans. T h at
accountability is discharged, in p a rt, by ensuring th a t shareholders receive relevant
and reliable financial inform ation about the com pany perform ance and financial
position."4 The board should expect the a u d ito r to assist it in discharg ing th a t
responsibility to the shareholders, and th e a u d ito r should assume the obligation to
do so. Therefore, the full board needs to have direct exposure to the auditors a t
least once a year p rio r to reappointm ent o f the auditor.
The involvement o f the auditor with the full board o f directors is not intended in any way
to bypass the audit committee or to replicate the committee’s work at the full board level.
The committee would continue to review with the auditors the details o f the company’s
financial statements, management’s discussion and analysis [MD&A], other financial data
and systems, and audit findings and judgments related thereto. It is the intention o f the
Panel’s suggestions that audit committees would report the auditor’s views at meetings o f
the full board and would ask the auditor to be present at such meetings as frequently as
necessary, but at least once a year.
The a u d it committee should:
•

expect the auditor, as an expert in accounting and financial reporting, to express
independent judgm ents about th e appropriateness, not ju st acceptability, of the
accounting principles5 and the clarity o f the financial disclosure practices used o r
proposed to be adopted by the com pany;

•

h ear directly from the auditors on w hether m anagem ent’s choices of accounting
principles are conservative, m oderate, o r extreme from the perspective of
income, asset, and liability recognition, and w hether those principles are
common practices o r are m inority practices;

•

be inform ed of the au d ito r’s reasoning in determ ining the appropriateness of
changes in accounting principles and disclosure practices;

4Relevance and reliability are identified as the two key qualities of financial information in FASB
Concepts Statement No. 2, Qualitative Characteristics o f Accounting Information. The opening sentence
of the November 1993 report, The Information Needs o f Investors and Creditors, of the AICPA Special
Committee on Financial Reporting (Jenkins Committee), states: “Investment and credit decision making
based on information that is less than timely, relevant and reliable inevitably leads to unfu lfilled
expectations about financial reporting and less effective capital markets.”
5As noted earlier in this report, accounting principles include not only broad guidelines of general
application but also detailed practices and procedures for implementing them.
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•

be inform ed of the au d ito r’s reasoning in determ ining the appropriateness of the
accounting principles and disclosure practices adopted by m anagem ent for new
transactions o r events;

•

be inform ed of the au d ito r’s reasoning in accepting o r questioning significant
estim ates m ade by m anagem ent;

•

be inform ed of and discuss th e appropriateness of all new accounting principles
an d disclosure practices on a timely basis;

•

discuss w ith th e a u d ito r how th e com pany’s choices of accounting principles and
disclosure practices may affect shareholders and public views and attitudes
ab o u t the com pany; and

•

review the a u d ito r’s fees to insure th a t they a re ap p ro p riate for th e services they
render.

T he a u d ito rs’ reviews w ith the au d it com m ittee and w ith th e full b o ard a t least once
a y e ar w ould help provide a basis for the com m ittee to recom m end to the board, and
for th e board to recom m end to th e shareholders, the appointm ent o r ratification of
the a u d ito r for the new fiscal year.6
Responsibilities of A uditors to th e B oard
In U nited States v. Arthur Young & Co., the Supreme Court o f the United States
concluded that the independent public accountant “owes ultimate allegiance to the
corporation’s creditors and stockholders, as well as to the investing public. This ‘public
watchdog’ function demands that the accountant maintain total independence from the
client at all times and requires complete fidelity to the public trust.”
While “public watchdog” is an apt description o f the auditor’s public interest
responsibility, the Panel does not believe that it is useful or workable, for purposes o f
defining the auditor-client relationship, to say that “the public” is the auditor’s true client.
N or is it practical for “the shareholders” to be the auditor’s client, though clearly, as noted
by the FASB in its conceptual framework, investors and creditors are the key user groups
to whom corporate financial reports are directed and, therefore, the principal beneficiaries
o f the audit.

6Though not a specific legal requirement, it is a widespread practice among publicly traded companies to
ask shareholders to approve the selection of independent auditors or to ratify the prior approval by the
board of directors. The proxy rules do require disclosure, in proxy statements for annual shareholders’
meetings, of the identity of the auditing firm proposed for the current year, a change of auditor from the
prior year and whether such change was approved by the board or audit committee, disagreements with
the auditor, and whether representatives of the current and prior year auditing firm will attend the annual
meeting.
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Unfortunately, the auditor’s public responsibility can be undermined when financial
management becomes the primary intermediary between corporations and auditing firms.
As one observer noted, financial management has, at times, “captured the auditors.” That
situation should be changed. By no means is the Panel advocating that the auditor-client
relationship become adversarial. On the other hand, too close a relationship between the
auditor and management can inhibit independent judgments.
In most companies today, management selects or recommends auditors and changes in
auditors, negotiates fees, guides the audit, prepares the financial statements, selects
accounting principles, and makes estimates. Clearly, a smooth working relationship
between auditor and management is important, but there is a downside. Too close a
relationship can discourage the auditor from speaking up if the auditor questions the
accounting principles selected, the clarity o f disclosures, or the estimates and judgments
made by management. Such a relationship can inhibit or foreclose the auditor from openly
communicating with the board of directors or audit committee.
The Panel believes that it is essential for the accounting profession to bring greater
clarity to the issue of who is the auditor’s client. The board of directors, as the
representative of the shareholders, should be the client, not corporate management.
Boards, particularly independent directors, and auditors are, or should be, natural
allies in protecting shareholder interests. The auditor should be brought into the
mainstream of corporate governance.
The trend in corporate governance is to hold the board more accountable to shareholders
and management more accountable to the board. Clarifying the role o f auditors in helping
the board exercise its responsibility would place the management-auditor relationship back
in balance. Shareholders and boards should expect auditors to challenge management’s
views on accounting principles, disclosure practices, and accounting estimates and to
inform the board about how shareholders’ interests are affected by management’s
accounting choices within the range o f acceptable practice.
Independent auditors have not played a forceful role in assessing and communicating
about the clarity o f the disclosures and the appropriateness o f the accounting principles
adopted and estimates made by their clients. Independent CPAs are licensed as
auditors and experts on accounting and financial control matters. They should be
willing to express their views as experts to the audit committee and the full board of
directors about the appropriateness of the accounting principles and financial
disclosure practices used or proposed to be adopted by the company and,
particularly, about the degree of aggressiveness or conservatism of the company’s
accounting principles and underlying estimates and the relevance and reliability of
the resulting information for investment, credit, and similar decisions.
Several o f the foregoing recommendations entail discussion o f accounting principles by the
auditors with the audit committee and the full board. In making those recommendations,
the Panel is not addressing the nature or degree o f detail o f the formal guidance that
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should be provided for making accounting choices and accounting estimates or whether
the range o f choices should be limited. Those are matters for the accounting standard
setters. N or are the Panel’s recommendations intended to change, in any way, the
auditor’s obligation to speak out if it is the auditor’s professional judgment that a chosen
accounting principle or estimate is outside the bounds o f acceptable practice.
W hat the Panel is seeking is an open dialog between the members o f the board and the
auditor regarding the particular choice that was made within the range of acceptable
practice— how that choice affects the relevance and reliability o f the company’s reported
financial data and, ultimately, how that choice affects the shareholder and public views and
attitudes about the company.
U n d er the Panel’s approach, the a u d ito r would not only evaluate the com pany’s
com pliance w ith generally accepted accounting principles b u t also express, to the
a u d it committee and the board of directors, a qualitative ju d g m en t about the
com pany’s choices of principles, disclosures, and estimates. F o r years, the auditing
stan d a rd s have required the a u d ito r to ju d g e w hether th e accounting principles
selected and applied are “ap p ro p riate in th e circum stances.” The stan d ard to which
the a u d ito r has been held in m aking th a t ju d g m en t has been w hether the selected
principle falls w ithin the range o f acceptable practice. The Panel would hold the
a u d ito r to a different standard in com m unicating w ith the b o ard of directors.
The Panel also believes th a t the au d it com m ittee, the board, an d the au d ito r need to
have an earlier involvement in accounting questions th an is often the case today.
Management should recognize its obligation to bring new transactions and proposed new
accounting policies to the attention o f the auditors, the audit committee, and the board
while they are being contemplated, not after the fact or after financial information based
on those transactions or policies has been released publicly. Candid discussion between
management and the auditors may lead to complete agreement about the most appropriate
practices to recommend to the board or may, in some cases, define differing views o f
management and the auditing firm. In making this suggestion, the Panel does not intend
to imply that any changes in auditing standards for field work or reporting are needed but,
rather, simply wishes to encourage more timely, more frequent, and more open
communication between the board and the auditor.7
The Panel’s suggestions are intended to help the board o f directors fulfill its
responsibilities to the shareholders—responsibilities in which the board and the
A possible exception relates to Section 380 of the current auditing standards, which requires
communication to the audit committee “about the process used by management in formulating particularly
sensitive accounting estimates and about the basis for the auditor’s conclusions regarding the
reasonableness of those estimates” (AU 380.08). There is no comparable requirement for reporting on the
rationale for and the auditor’s conclusions regarding “the initial selection of and changes in significant
accounting policies or their application” (AU 380.07). While most of the suggestions that the Panel
makes in this report are in the form of encouragement and expectation-building rather than proposed rule
changes, if the Panel's suggestions about expanding the auditor's responsibilities to the Board are adopted,
it may be appropriate to modify Section 380 accordingly.

19

independent auditor have a coincidence o f interest— and are not in any way intended to
suggest that auditors usurp the responsibilities o f directors or management.
Greater involvement by all board members with the auditors would have a salutary effect
o f insuring that firms are likely to elevate the quality o f the people they assign to the
account, and it would offer the board an independent view o f the company’s accounting
choices, internal controls, and, if warranted, business operations.
Moreover, the broader responsibilities that the Panel would impose on auditors would
make appointing the auditor more than a routine, symbolic act. Those responsibilities
would acknowledge that the board expects the auditor to take an active role in overseeing
and strengthening the company’s financial reporting process. And they would make clear
that the board’s decision on auditor reappointment will be based on how well the auditor
has helped the board to fulfill its responsibility to protect shareholder interests. Assisting
the board in its fiduciary mission is the essence of the au d ito r’s own obligation to
the public— and the hallm ark of the a u d ito r’s professionalism.
The A uditor’s Evaluation of the Ap p ro p riateness of
A ccounting Principles. Disclosure Practices, and Estim ates
Recommendations V-6, V-7, and V-8 in the March 1993 POB Special Report would seem
to hold auditors to a higher standard than “falling within a range o f acceptable limits” in
evaluating the appropriateness o f accounting policies. The Panel’s recommendation that
auditors express their expert views to the audit committee and, in summary, to the board
o f directors about the appropriateness o f the company’s accounting principles and
underlying estimates and the clarity o f the related financial disclosure practices is
consistent with the objective o f those POB recommendations. However, the Panel would
go a bit further.
Recommendations V-6 and V-8 focus only on an accounting principle adopted for a new
kind o f transaction or event and would impose a special duty on the auditor and,
separately, on the “concurring partner” to be satisfied that the new accounting principle
properly reflects the economic substance o f the transaction in accordance with basic
concepts o f financial reporting. Recommendation V-7 suggests that peer reviewers not
only should evaluate the consultation process by which a firm’s technical office reaches
specific accounting conclusions but also “should inquire whether that process leads to
accounting that is appropriate in the circumstances [and] evaluate the quality o f the
conclusions reached.”
Recommendations in the POB Special Report would, in effect, ask the audit committee to
judge (V-9) and opine (V-10) on the appropriateness o f all o f a company’s accounting
principles, not just those for new transactions and events.
The Panel agrees with the POB’s objectives in Recommendations V-6 through V-10, but
the Panel would achieve those objectives by making the auditor more proactive rather than
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reactive and by making it explicit that disclosure practices, and the clarity thereof, are
integral to relevant and reliable financial information.
The Panel would place the initial burden on the auditor, rather than the audit
committee, to judge the appropriateness, not Just the acceptability, o f a company’s
accounting principles. In fact, the Panel has reservations about requiring public
reporting by audit committees regarding the appropriateness o f the company’s
accounting principles, as POB Recommendation V-10 suggests. Further, the Panel
would place the burden on the auditor to discuss with the audit committee the
clarity o f disclosure practices and the appropriateness and effect o f the accounting
estimates made by management. Finally, the auditor should assume responsibility
to evaluate not only the appropriateness of an accounting principle proposed for a
new type o f transaction or event but also the continuing appropriateness of old
accounting principles. As suggested earlier in this report, the audit committee and
the board o f directors should expect the auditor to assume those responsibilities.
The Panel’s objective is not to narrow the range o f acceptable accounting practices for a
particular kind o f transaction or event (that may follow in due course) but to encourage
open communication with the audit committee and the board o f directors about new as
well as ongoing policies and the professional auditor’s expert views thereon. The
expectation that auditors will express their expert views to the committee and the board
will enhance their objectivity in considering management’s chosen practices—both
principles and estimates.
The Panel is hopeful that expecting auditors to judge and communicate to the audit
committee and the board the appropriateness o f accounting principles and practices may
discourage the auditing profession from seeking authoritative “bright line” guidance for
every accounting and auditing question that arises. The independent audit is in danger o f
becoming totally rule-driven and compliance-oriented. The search for “bright lines” is a
symptom o f a problem, not a solution. Auditors often ask standard setters for rules that
enable the auditor to draw lines with clients and not run the risk o f a competitor not
drawing the same line. The SEC S ta ff Report on A uditor Independence acknowledges the
SEC’s own push for “simple, bright-line accounting principles and auditing standards.”
Standards, no matter how detailed, should be regarded as a framework or constraints
within which professional judgment should be exercised; they are not a substitute for that
judgment.
Accounting firms have procedures for providing guidance to practice partners and staff in
difficult or unusual accounting situations. Some firms have written policies setting forth
the firm’s own view as to the “best” or “preferred” or “appropriate” accounting practice.
Those procedures and policies can be the basis for supporting the auditor in
communicating with the board about the appropriateness o f accounting principles.
Knowing that they will have to communicate about accounting principles, disclosure
practices, and estimates to the audit committee and the full board o f directors will be

21

further impetus for the firms’ technical offices to develop procedures and policies to assist
partners in making qualitative judgments.
The Panel’s suggestions for enhancing the value o f the independent audit to the board are
consistent with one o f the key conclusions at a special 1993 Audit/Assurance Conference
jointly sponsored by the AICPA and the Big 6 accounting firms;
The conference participants... concluded that the assurance function should
place a renewed emphasis on meeting user needs. That function should be
redefined and expanded to (1) focus on a wider array o f information and
information processes, (2) provide a means for auditors to provide their own
qualitative comments and add to the information presented, and (3) evaluate the
relevance o f the information presented.
That conference led to the recent appointment by the AICPA Board o f Directors o f a
Special Committee on Assurance Services that will critically examine auditing and related
assurance services in the same way as the AICPA Special Committee on Financial
Reporting (Jenkins Committee) is examining the information needs o f users o f financial
reports. The Panel encourages those and other efforts currently under way within the
accounting profession to improve the usefulness o f accounting data and the value o f the
independent audit. The Panel encourages the POB to prod the profession to follow
through on implementation o f those efforts.
The Panel’s suggestion that auditors report to the board on the appropriateness and
aggressiveness o f accounting principles is not without potential dangers. One undesirable
result could be “opinion shopping” among accounting firms. While the common starting
point from which all would assess appropriateness should be the relevance and reliability
o f the resulting information, the Panel recognizes that other accounting firms or even
management might think differently from the auditor. One commentator referred to such
differences o f opinion as “creative tension” between management and the auditors, which
the Panel regards as healthy by alerting the board to the choices the corporation has and
the merits o f alternative courses o f action.
W ith the right atmosphere— directors recognizing their responsibilities and auditors
fulfilling theirs— the result will be a forthright interchange o f professional views,
thereby giving directors a better basis for influencing corporate practices. However,
that right atmosphere can be quickly dissipated if directors do not encourage
auditors’ forthrightness and, if necessary, discourage any management efforts to
inhibit the auditor.
Some corporate boards might not welcome auditor
forthrightness, but that does not relieve the auditor of what the Panel believes is— or
should be— an overriding professional responsibility always to express an objective,
expert judgment even if not welcomed.
Another potential problem is that the SEC might look on the auditor’s forthright
discussion as leverage to force changes in principles, disclosures, or estimates. That
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would defeat the Panel’s objective. If it is the auditor’s view that the client’s accounting is
“acceptable” but “liberal” or “aggressive” or not the “most appropriate,” the SEC should
not insist that such observations are a basis for forcing the registrant to change
accounting. The SEC must foster the auditor’s professionalism. The SEC must recognize
that the auditor’s professional judgment may differ from that o f management, another
firm, and, indeed, the SEC. The SEC should encourage boards o f directors to consider
the auditor’s viewpoint together with that o f management and take whatever action they
deem in the best interests of the shareholders.
T he P anel’s Suggestions A re a T h ree-P art Package
In sum m ary, the Panel’s suggestions for strengthening the relationship between the
board of directors and the a u d ito r are a three-p a rt package. All three steps are
needed to ensure th a t the com pany’s financial reports m eet the shareholders’ need
for relevant and reliable inform ation. (1) The bo ard m ust recognize the prim acy of
its accountability to shareholders. (2) The a u d ito r m ust look to the board of
directors as the client. (3) The board m ust expect and th e au d ito r m ust deliver
candid com m unication about the appropriateness, not ju s t acceptability, of
accounting principles and estimates an d the clarity of th e related disclosures of
financial inform ation th a t the com pany reports publicly.
A re A dditional Public R eports Needed?
A number o f proposals have been made recently for additional reports detailing the roles
and relationships between the auditors, the board, the audit committee, and/or
management to be included in proxy materials or annual reports. Examples o f the
proposed reports include the Treadway Commission’s recommendation that the annual
report include a letter from the audit committee describing its responsibilities and
activities; Recommendation V-10 in the POB Special Report proposing a similarly detailed
statement from the audit committee; Recommendation II-1 in the POB Special Report that
the SEC require registrants to disclose whether the auditors have had a peer review and its
results; Recommendation V-12 in the POB Special Report that the SEC require registrants
to include, with the annual financial statements, separate reports by management and the
independent accountant on the effectiveness o f the company’s internal control system
relating to financial reporting; and the various reports mandated for banks by the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act o f 1991 (which include reports on
internal control, compliance with laws and regulations, and reviews o f interim financial
statements).
The Panel is concerned that these additional reports can become lengthy “boilerplate” that
does not get to the heart of the underlying issue o f strengthening auditor accountability
Instead of the lengthier proposed reports, the Panel would encourage a simple
statem ent in the proxy th a t the board meets a t least annually w ith its auditors to
obtain th e ir observations, review th eir perform ance, and set the term s of their
engagem ent.
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Relationship among Auditors, Standard Setters, and the SEC8
Because they share common objectives w ith respect to the public interest, there
m ust be more cooperative, less adversarial relationships am ong the public
accounting profession, the stan d ard setters, and th e SEC. The main goal o f all should
be to reflect in financial statements the most useful information about the business
transactions and events occurring during the reporting period.
The working relationships among the accounting profession, the standard setters, and the
SEC have been damaged and need to be repaired. Evidence o f that damage includes the
speeches by the Chief Accountant o f the SEC cited earlier, actions by the large public
accounting firms in connection with the FASB’s project on accounting for stock-based
compensation (characterized by the Chief Accountant as possible “cheerleading” for their
clients), and the SEC’s effort to establish accounting standards on accrual o f restructuring
costs through the minutes of the FASB Emerging Issues Task Force.
The auditors, standard setters, and the SEC all have an interest in improved financial
reporting. Though the three groups have distinct roles in the corporate financial reporting
process, their mutual concern for the public interest requires that they communicate, treat
each other with respect, and cooperate in the standard-setting process. Only more
cooperative relationships and the give and take o f professional discussions can bring these
groups together to assure prompt and thoughtful improvements in financial reporting.
Responsibilities of A ccounting Firm s in th e S tandard-S etting Process
Earlier in this report, the Panel noted ways in which the firms’ professionalism in dealing
with standard setters might be enhanced. Those enhancements are particularly important
since efforts to influence the outcome o f FASB deliberations have become much more
organized and effective in recent years.
Until the past few years, accounting firms and business enterprises, for the most part, put
forth their views individually. M ore and more, group responses are prepared (some
groups are organized solely for one FASB project and some written responses look like
political petitions), and commentators disseminate their views widely in the hope o f
influencing others. Even corporate chief executive officers have a hand in developing and
espousing accounting positions. The most aggressive lobbying effort ever is currently
taking place in opposition to the FASB’s proposal to require that compensation expense

8In the course of its study, the Panel interviewed and received written input from representatives of the
SEC and several banking regulators. Those interviews and communications were helpful to the Panel in
gaining insights into issues affecting auditors’ objectivity, integrity, and independence. The observations
in this section of the Panel’s report concentrate on the auditor’s relationships with the SEC and the
accounting standard setters, though some of our observations may also be applicable to relationships with
other regulators.
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be recognized in the income statement for the estimated fair value o f stock options granted
to employees.
The Big 6 senior partners now meet regularly and are a natural target for those lobbying
activities. We understand that those meetings are occasionally with representatives o f The
Business Roundtable. While there may be legitimate reason for those senior partners to
meet and to communicate publicly on issues affecting the profession as a whole,
communicating a single view in jointly signed letters on accounting for stock
compensation, first on February 17, 1993, before an FASB Exposure Draft was issued,
and then again on July 15, 1994 after meeting with representatives o f The Business
Roundtable, gives the appearance o f trying to impress the FASB with clout rather than
reasoning. Those letters are being used by lobbyists and cannot help but create the
impression that those senior partners and the firms they represent have responded both to
peer pressure and to pressure from organized business groups that include the firms’ major
clients.
The perception problem in the stock compensation matter is accentuated by the fact that
the firms’ joint position in the 1993 and 1994 letters differed fr om that taken in a 1984
letter to the FASB fr om AcSEC. That letter urged the FASB to undertake the project
and to make a “major change” by recognizing compensation cost based on a measure o f
the “minimum value” o f an option at the grant date, and many o f the firms themselves had
expressed similar views to the FASB. Clearly, over time a firm may change its view on a
technical accounting issue without being guilty o f subordination o f professional judgment.
In the stock compensation case, the firms whose views changed explained those changes
in submissions to the FASB during the intervening period. However, to be considered
independent in matters o f accounting principle, the Big 6 accounting firms should go to
great lengths to avoid the appearance o f being unduly influenced by clients or exerting
undue pressure on the FASB. Even the appearance o f such behavior can undermine the
public’s respect for the profession.
The Big 6 senior partners should recognize that joint actions instigated by them or jointly
approved by them, particularly those impacting on the standard setting process, just
reopen the door for the conspiracy theories investigated by Congressional committees in
the mid-1970s (see, for example, The Accounting Establishment, a 1,760 page staff study
prepared by a Senate subcommittee, which criticized the SEC for “delegating its public
authority and responsibilities on accounting matters to private groups with obvious selfinterests in the resolution o f such matters” and “the alarming lack o f independence and
lack o f dedication to public protection shown by the large accounting firms.”) For
reasons o f public perception, the Panel believes th a t com m unications to th e FASB
(or o th er sta n d a rd setters) on accounting policies should not come jointly from the
Big 6.
Individual firms an d duly constituted committees of professional
organizations such as the A ICPA are the ap p ro p riate vehicles for com m unicating
w ith sta n d a rd setters.
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F u rth e r, individual firms should be careful in how they com m unicate th e ir views to
th e ir clients and the public a t large. Selective or unusually wide distribution o f those
views, particularly when the firm opposes a proposed action o f standard setters, can easily
be read as resulting from client pressure or unprofessional lobbying by the firm.
Moreover, actions o f this sort are transparent and are seen by the standard setters, the
regulators, and the investing public as an indication that the business community has
captured the public accounting profession.
Responsibilities of the S tandard Setters in the Private Sector
The standard setters should be committed to setting standards that will result in the most
useful— that is, relevant and reliable—information in the financial statements. For the
FASB and AcSEC that means never to lose sight o f the primacy o f relevance and
reliability in their decision process. In the case o f the Auditing Standards Board it means
standards that increase the likelihood that the financial statements are free from material
misstatement.
Standard setters should be committed to addressing and resolving issues on a timely basis.
While the SEC certainly cannot dictate the FASB’s agenda, there should be a presumption
that an accounting issue called to the FASB’s attention by the SEC Chief Accountant
warrants careful and timely consideration. The FASB itself needs to be more aggressive in
bringing issues to the table for discussion.
Responsibilities of the SEC
Enforcing accounting and auditing standards is a separate matter from establishing those
standards. Enforcement is clearly the SEC’s bailiwick, not the FASB’s or the EITF’s or
AcSEC’s or the Auditing Standards Board’s. In the area o f setting accounting and
auditing standards, the SEC’s principal focus should involve constructive assistance to
those and other private-sector professional groups in their efforts to resolve complex
questions. The SEC should be a standard setter o f last resort, acting only if the profession
is unable to do what is necessary in a timely fashion and, even then, only after appropriate
due process. Recently, some SEC accounting guidelines have been announced in speeches
or comments at public meetings rather than through formal Staff Accounting Bulletins or
rule-making, and accountants in public practice and industry have nicknamed them “turboSABs.”
The links between the SEC and the various standard-setting bodies already are in place to
enable the SEC to provide the constructive assistance that the Panel envisions. However,
in the judgment o f the Panel, some adjustments are needed—to replace what some view as
impatience and second-guessing on the part o f the SEC (OCA and the Division o f
Corporation Finance) with tolerance and respect.
The Panel believes that a better dialog should take place between the SEC and the
profession when a firm or a registrant wishes to propose a new or different accounting
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treatment. There is need for restraint and balance. Advocacy or acceptance o f a practice
should not be publicly labeled as “incredible” unless it has resulted in an ethics action or a
Rule 2(e) proceeding.
The SEC must also recognize that, on occasion, an accounting firm may support a
registrant’s request that the SEC regard a particular accounting principle or disclosure
practice as acceptable even though the accounting firm may have expressed a preference
for a different principle or practice in earlier discussions with the registrant’s board o f
directors and management. As the Panel noted earlier, the SEC should not use the
auditor’s frank discussions with the board o f directors as leverage against the registrant.
If the Panel’s suggestions for strengthening the relationship between the board and the
auditor are implemented, the number o f these situations should decline.
The EITF
The FASB established its Emerging Issues Task Force in 1984 to help the Board identify
emerging accounting issues and problems in implementing authoritative pronouncements.
EITF members include the senior technical partners o f major national and regional public
accounting firms as well as representatives o f major associations o f preparers, such as the
Financial Executives Institute, The Business Roundtable, and the Institute o f Management
Accountants. The SEC’s Chief Accountant and a member o f the AICPA’s Accounting
Standards Executive Committee (AcSEC) also participate.
The composition o f the EITF is designed to include persons in a position to be aware o f
emerging issues before divergent accounting practices become entrenched.
The
participation o f the SEC Chief Accountant is important to the process o f the EITF. Often,
EITF agenda issues are problems that have been identified by the SEC as a result o f the
securities registration and annual reporting process.
And the Chief Accountant’s
involvement is strong impetus for a private-sector self-imposed solution to a problem.
The EITF meets approximately six times a year and publishes a record o f its proceedings.
Often, as a result o f discussing an issue at an EITF meeting, the group reaches a general
consensus on appropriate accounting practice, which the FASB can usually take as an
indication that no Board action is needed. On the other hand, the inability o f the group to
reach a consensus may be an indication that action by the FASB is necessary.
M ost observers regard the EITF’s first ten years as successful in identifying emerging
problems and reaching solutions to most o f them that are “acceptable” to the both the
FASB and SEC, avoiding the need for FASB Interpretations and Technical Bulletins or
SEC Staff Accounting Bulletins.
Critical to the work o f the EITF are leadership o f the FASB, the willingness o f public
accounting firms to identify and resolve problems, and restraint and constructive
assistance by the SEC. That restraint recently appeared to have broken down, in the view
o f the Panel, when the Chief Accountant o f the SEC added detailed guidance on
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accounting for restructuring charges to the minutes o f an EITF meeting even though the
EITF had not reached a consensus on that guidance and the guidance had not been stated
at the meeting.
To foster professionalism, the SEC m ust m onitor the E IT F process b u t exercise
re strain t and let the system w ork. Simply put, the SEC must recognize that “bright
lines” may not be apparent to all. I f the EITF cannot resolve an issue and the SEC cannot
wait for the FASB, the SEC should follow its process o f rule-making or issuing a Staff
Accounting Bulletin or other form o f release. The FASB and its EITF should not be used
as a vehicle for communicating the views o f the SEC that have not been discussed by the
group following its established processes.
The Panel believes th a t the SEC, th rough its registration and annual reporting
process, can and should serve as an early-w arning m echanism for the kinds of
accounting practice problem s th a t have been criticized in the media o r have been
classified as “ incredible.” (For example, how did the restructuring issue get so far along
in its life cycle that it reached crisis proportions before the problem was taken up by
EITF?) In the environment o f mutual trust and cooperation that the Panel envisions, the
SEC would inform the FASB and its EITF o f the matter and look to them for resolution.
FASB-EITF would have the obligation to meet on short notice to deal quickly with
developing problems identified by the SEC or others. With the advent o f increasing
technology, time has become o f the essence. Certainly, this approach ought to dispose o f
the fr ivolous and unmeritorious proposals quickly, leaving only a few for more in-depth
analysis.
The mechanism that the Panel describes is not new. It is in place today. What is missing
is an attitude o f mutual respect and cooperation and a commitment to resolving
accounting questions quickly within established procedures.
The FASB has recently formed a committee to review the structure and operation o f the
EITF now that it has completed its tenth year o f operations. The review will consider the
EITF’s mission (“to assist the Board in its efforts to provide timely guidance on emerging
issues and implementation questions,”) whether it is adequately fulfilling that mission, and
whether the mission should be revised. The review will also consider the EITF’s
relationship with the FASB, AcSEC, and the SEC as well as procedural matters relating to
the EITF’s operations. The Panel commends the FASB for undertaking this review.
While the Panel believes that seeking “bright-line” standards and EITF guidance is a
symptom o f the audit function’s slide into a compliance and rule-oriented approach, it is
also mindful that deciding what is acceptable for purposes o f opining on the fairness o f
financial statements is the profession’s primary responsibility. The EITF is a good privatesector response that fits the present professional environment.
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A Better Legal Environment for Auditor Professionalism
Litigation has had a damaging and costly impact on the profession—and on the public it
serves— by discouraging new entrants into auditing, by focusing business strategies and
management efforts within larger firms on nonaudit services entailing lower litigation
risks, by encouraging a proliferation o f detailed standards to serve as a protection against
second-guessing by litigants and thereby making audits more compliance and rule-book
oriented, and by creating an atmosphere in which auditors are reluctant to make
independent professional judgments.
A better legal and regulatory environment will permit auditors, without fear o f exposure to
unwarranted and excessive liability, to express their professional judgments to boards o f
directors as experts in accounting and financial reporting on the matters described earlier
in this report. Further, a better legal environment would encourage the profession to
analyze and learn from audit failures. After all, prom pt, constructive self-analysis o f
mistakes is a hallmark o f a profession.
For those reasons, prompt tort reform to reduce accountants' liability is o f vital
importance to the future o f the profession and its ability to serve the investing public.
Looking ahead, the efforts now underway in the profession to enhance the value o f the
attest function and to improve financial reporting may make tort reform and possibly some
legal or regulatory safe harbors even more important.
Currently under consideration is the “Private Securities Litigation Reform Act o f 1994,”
introduced in the Congress early in 1994 by Senator Christopher J. Dodd. Under that bill,
the SEC would create or designate a “Public Accounting Self-Disciplinary Board” to
register all firms o f independent auditors o f public companies and investigate and
discipline accounting firms. The bill would also provide certain tort reforms. The AICPA
and the Big 6 accounting firms are supporting the bill.
T he tim e has come for th e SEC to take the lead in helping th e profession reduce its
exposure to u n w arran ted litigation. The SEC has an enorm ous stake in th e viability
of th e profession. T he Commission com m ands great respect w ith the Congress and
w ith th e investing public. In th e Panel’s ju d g m en t, th ere are dangers n o t ju s t to th e
profession b u t to the investing public if the cu rren t liability situation continues to
d rift w ithout SEC leadership.
Tort reform is necessary but will not be sufficient alone to enhance the integrity,
objectivity, and professionalism o f the independent auditing function. The Panel believes
th a t th e suggestions in this re p o rt can be considered separately from , an d need not
aw ait, legislative action on litigation reform . These suggestions for im proving
a u d ito r professionalism will need the vigorous su p p o rt of th e SEC in helping to
create th e kind of supportive environm ent described earlier in this report.
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V.

C O N C L U S IO N S

The Panel stated at the beginning that the profession is at a critical juncture. While much
has been done to enhance auditors’ integrity, objectivity, and independence, there are
fu ndamental developments at work that could over time undermine the independent role
o f the profession in the private sector. The Panel does not pretend to have detailed
recommendations offering instant solutions. Rather, the Panel has pointed out the
underlying issues facing the profession and offered suggestions as to what should be done
to bring auditing into the mainstream o f corporate governance and to restore auditing to
its im portant role in our society. The Panel’s principal conclusions are:
1.
There is no need at this time for additional rules, regulations, or legislation dealing
with the conflict-of-interest aspect o f auditor independence.
There are, however,
important steps that should be taken in other ways to strengthen the professionalism o f
independent auditors.
2.
Auditing is different from other services accounting firms render. It imposes
special and higher responsibilities. Independent auditing firms, regulators, and overseers
o f the public accounting profession need to focus on how the audit function can be
enhanced and not submerged in large multi-line public accounting/management consulting
firms.
3.
The Public Oversight Board, the SEC, and others should support proposals to
enhance the independence o f boards o f directors and their accountability to shareholders.
Stronger, more accountable corporate boards o f directors will strengthen the
professionalism o f the outside auditor, enhance the value o f the independent audit, and
serve the investing public.
4.
To increase the value o f the independent audit, corporate boards o f directors and
their audit committees must hear from independent auditors their views as professional
advisors on the appropriateness o f the accounting principles used or proposed to be
adopted by the company, the clarity o f its financial disclosures, and the degree of
aggressiveness or conservatism o f the company’s accounting principles and underlying
estimates.
5.
The accounting profession should look to the representatives o f the shareholders—
the board o f directors— as the client, not corporate management. Boards and auditors are,
or should be, natural allies in protecting shareholder interests.
6.
Auditors must assume the obligation to communicate qualitative judgments about
accounting principles, disclosures, and estimates. By doing so, independent auditors can
add to the effectiveness o f boards o f directors in monitoring corporate performance on
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behalf o f shareholders and in assuring that shareholders receive relevant and reliable
financial information about company performance and financial condition.
7.
By making these suggestions to boards and auditors, the Panel’s objective is not to
narrow the range o f acceptable accounting practices (that may follow in due course) but to
give directors a better basis for influencing corporate practices. These suggestions should
also enhance the objectivity and strengthen the professionalism o f the auditor.
8.
Because they share the objective o f providing the public with relevant and reliable
financial information, the public accounting profession, the standard setters, and the SEC
must have more cooperative, less adversarial relationships. CPA firms should be careful in
how they communicate their views to the FASB, the SEC, their clients, and the public at
large. The SEC should help identify accounting practice problems and look to the private
sector standard setters to solve them. It should only be a standard setter o f “last resort”
and then only after appropriate due process.
9.
It is urgent that the SEC take the lead in helping the profession to reduce exposure
to unwarranted litigation. There are dangers, not just to the profession but to the
investing public, if the current liability situation continues to drift without SEC leadership.
10.
While tort reform is necessary, the other suggestions in this report can be
considered separately from, and need not await, legislative action on litigation reform.
For the future, the Panel believes that the SEC and the POB should consider devoting
resources to stay informed on a continuing basis about developments in the auditing
profession and in the market for audit services. As described in this report, some o f those
developments could materially affect the viability o f the independent audit as a privatesector activity. By having the facts, the SEC and the POB will be in a position to
anticipate and take appropriate steps to strengthen auditor professionalism.
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A PPEN D IX A
PO B 1993 R EC O M M EN D A TIO N S D IRECTLY RELEVANT
TO T H E W O R K O F T H E A DVISORY PANEL
R ecom m endation V-3
T he A IC PA should u ndertake a project to sharpen fu rth e r th e distinction between
client advocacy an d client service and incorporate th a t distinction into the
profession’s C ode o f Professional C onduct. Individual accounting firm s should
constantly review th e ir program s regarding client advocacy an d client service to
strengthen th e desire of each a u d it p a rtn e r to protect the firm ’s independence.
R ecom m endation V-4
A ccounting firm s should take special care to ensure th a t th e ir participation in the
sta n d a rd setting process is characterized by objectivity and professionalism.
S ta n d a rd setters an d leaders o f the profession should discuss and address th e issues
related to client advocacy in the stan d ard setting process and establish ways o f
identifying and correcting a b e rra n t behavior when it occurs.
R ecom m endation V-5
F irm s’ consultation policies and procedures should ensure th a t client accounting
issues a re n o t discussed w ith SEC staff w ithout the benefit of consultation a t the
a p p ro p ria te level w ithin the firm .
R ecom m endation V-6
T he following recom m endation of the M acdonald Commission [of the C anadian
In stitu te o f C h artered A ccountants] should be adopted by th e A uditing S tan d ard s
B oard in th e U nited States:
W hen new accounting policies are adopted in response to new types of
transactions o r new kinds o f assets o r obligations, th e a u d ito r should be
satisfied th a t the accounting policies adopted properly reflect the economic
substance o f th e transaction, asset, o r liability in accordance w ith th e broad
th eo ry governing present-day financial reporting an d th e established concept
o f conservatism in the face o f uncertainty.
R ecom m endation V-7
P eer review ers should evaluate the consultation process by which specific
accounting conclusions are reached, as they do now, and should also inquire
w h eth er th a t process leads to accounting th a t is ap p ro p riate in th e circum stances.
In testing com pliance w ith the consultation policies and procedures in a firm , the
peer review team should evaluate th e quality o f the conclusions reached.
continued...
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A PPEN D IX A (continued)
R ecom m endation V-8
T he concurring p a rtn e r, whose participation in an a u d it is a m em bership
req u irem en t of the SEC Practice Section, should be responsible fo r assuring th a t
those consulted on accounting m atters a re aw are o f all o f th e relevant facts and
circum stances, including an understanding o f th e financial statem ents in whose
context th e accounting policy is being considered. T he concurring an d consulting
p a rtn e rs should know enough abo u t the client to ensure th a t all o f th e relevant facts
an d circum stances are m arshalled, and also possess th e increased detachm ent th a t
comes from not having to face th e client on an ongoing basis. The concurring
p a rtn e r should have the responsibility to conclude w h eth er th e accounting
tre a tm e n t applied is consistent w ith the objectives o f R ecom m endation V-6.
R ecom m endation V-9
A u d it com m ittees (or the board if there is no a u d it com m ittee) should assum e the
following responsibilities relating to an SEC reg istran t’s p re p a ratio n of an n u al
financial statem ents: (a) review the annual financial statem ents; (b) confer w ith
m anagem ent and the independent a u d ito r ab o u t them ; (c) receive from the
in dependent a u d ito r all inform ation th a t th e au d ito r is req u ired to com m unicate
u n d e r a u d itin g standards; (d) assess w hether the financial statem ents are complete
a n d consistent w ith inform ation known to them ; and (e) assess w h eth er th e financial
statem ents reflect ap p ro p riate accounting principles.
R ecom m endation V-10
T he SE C should require registrants to include in a docum ent containing the annual
financial statem ents a statem ent by the a u d it com m ittee (or by th e b oard if th ere is
no a u d it com m ittee) th a t describes its responsibilities and tells how they w ere
discharged. This disclosure should state w hether th e au d it com m ittee m em bers (or,
in th e absence of an a u d it committee, the m em bers o f th e b o ard ): (a) have reviewed
th e a n n u al financial statem ents; (b) have conferred w ith m anagem ent and the
independent a u d ito r about them ; (c) have received from th e independent a u d ito r all
inform ation th a t the a u d ito r is required to com m unicate u n d e r auditing stan d ard s;
(d) believe th a t the financial statem ents are com plete and consistent w ith
inform ation know n to them ; and (e) believe th a t th e financial statem ents reflect
a p p ro p ria te accounting principles.
R ecom m endation V-11
T he a u d it com m ittee o r the board o f directors should be satisfi ed th a t the au d it fee
negotiated by it o r m anagem ent for the en tity ’s a u d it is sufficient to assure the
entity will receive a com prehensive and complete audit.
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A P P E N D IX B
T H E C H I E F A C C O U N T A N T ’S 1 9 9 4 S P E E C H

Chief Accountants o f the SEC have a long and healthy tradition o f candor with the
accounting profession, often using professional meetings and conferences to alert the
profession to important issues. On January 11, 1994 Chief Accountant Walter P.
Schuetze did that in a speech in which he called into question the independence o f
accounting firms in situations where they condoned “incredible” accounting principles in
financial statements, or advocated such principles before the staff o f the SEC, or were
overly influenced by client views in formulating their own positions on subjects under
scrutiny by the FASB. Mr. Schuetze had made similar charges in an August 1992 speech.
The points made in the January 1994 speech are as follows;
•

•

•

•

“Auditors [are] not standing up to their clients on financial accounting and reporting
issues when their clients take a position that is, at best, not supported in the
accounting literature or, at worst, directly contrary to existing accounting
pronouncements.”
Four specific cases argued before the Chief Accountant are examples o f the national
offices o f major firms advocating accounting contrary to the spirit, if not the letter, o f
GAAP.
There continue to be other “more broadly applicable” cases o f accepted accounting
practices contrary to accounting literature, such as “funded catastrophe covers” which
spread the losses from catastrophes rather than recognizing the losses at the time o f
the catastrophe as required by FASB Statement 5; not updating discount rates used in
measuring obligations for pensions and healthcare benefits, contrary to the
requirements o f FASB Statements 87 and 106; and inappropriate accounting for
investments in debt securities in 1992.
“CPAs may have become cheerleaders for their clients on the issue o f accounting for
stock options issued to employees.”

Subsequent to the appointment o f the Panel, the Office o f the Chief Accountant (OCA)
submitted its S ta ff Report on Auditor Independence (March 1994) to Congressman
Edward J. Markey in response to his earlier request. The Panel believes the S ta ff Report
on A uditor Independence puts in their proper context the comments o f Mr. Schuetze
regarding client advocacy in meetings with the Commission’s staff:
Client Advocacy.
In addition to the numerous independence issues that surround the conduct
o f an audit, the SEC staff is concerned that certain accounting firms may have
compromised their objectivity with respect to proposed or actual client accounting
treatments with the SEC staff. The Commission staff wishes to stress that the
number o f instances in which questionable client advocacy has been established is
very small in relation to the number o f audited financial statements filed with the

35

Commission. The staff continues to believe that the vast majority o f audits are
conducted in an appropriate skeptical manner. The staff also appreciates that
reasonable people may come to different conclusions on accounting issues and, in
good faith hold and represent views that differ from those o f the staff. The OCA
encourages registrants and their auditors to discuss and resolve financial
accounting and reporting issues with the staff. A different situation arises,
however, when high levels o f authority within major accounting firms appear to
argue unfounded positions before the staff. Some o f these instances cause the staff
to question the appearance o f auditor independence. [Footnote omitted.]
The staff believes that these events raise questions about whether the
auditor has maintained an appropriate relationship to his or her audit client. The
staff recognizes, however, that the problem o f an appearance o f “client advocacy”
may not be susceptible to correction through additional, objective independence
interpretations or rules. The current sanction for this type o f conduct is a possible
reduction in the credibility before the public on the accounting issues being
considered. This is a serious sanction, indeed. To prevent such a loss o f
confidence in a firm’s views, the firm, when accompanying audit clients to
meetings with the Commission staff or providing written substantiation for the
proposed accounting should present positions that are well-founded in, or logical
extensions of, authoritative accounting literature. [Footnote omitted]

The Four Cases
The Panel invited the auditors for each o f the four cases described by Mr. Schuetze as
“incredible” to submit a written summary o f the case, including the facts as the accounting
firm saw them, the accounting issues identified, the positions taken by the company and
the auditor, the circumstances o f the auditor’s “advocacy” o f the client’s position before
the SEC. All four auditing firms responded to the Panel’s request.
With the knowledge o f the four auditors, the Panel provided a copy o f the auditors’
responses to the Office o f the Chief Accountant o f the SEC, which prepared staff
memoranda responding to the auditors’ responses.
While Mr. Schuetze’s description o f the four cases as “incredible” was part o f the reason
that the POB appointed the panel, it is not the purpose o f the Panel to be an arbiter o f who
was right and who was wrong in each o f the four cases or whether they were, in fact,
incredible. The Panel believes that by concluding that “the number o f instances in which
questionable client advocacy has been established is very small in relation to the number o f
audited financial statements filed with the Commission,” the OCA S ta ff Report on A uditor
Independence removes much o f the sting from the four cases. Also the issues, at least in
part, do not appear to be as black and white as Mr. Schuetze portrayed them.
There are lessons that can be learned from this incident by both the firms and the
SEC— lessons that can help achieve the objective o f bolstering the independence,
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objectivity, and integrity o f independent auditors. Those lessons relate to relationships
and selection and retention o f accounting principles and practices and alertness to changes
in the business environment.
First, the presence o f a registrant’s auditor at the SEC is not necessarily inappropriate
behavior by the auditor, even if the auditor has a preference for an accounting principle
different from that proposed by the registrant. Accounting principles are not natural laws,
and reasonable people can reach different conclusions on accounting questions. Auditors
do not always agree with their clients on accounting matters, and the Panel believes that
an auditor has the expertise and a professional obligation to encourage the client to adopt
accounting principles that produce the most relevant and reliable financial information. At
the same time, supporting in a restrained, reasoned, and professional manner a client’s
position that the independent auditing firm believes is appropriate in the circumstances is
not advocacy or at least not an unacceptable kind o f advocacy.
Second, as the Panel noted earlier in this report, public accounting firms should adopt
mechanisms that ensure that their national technical offices are independent o f practice
partners who feel the direct pressure from client companies; that the standard to which the
national technical office personnel should be held in advising engagement partners is not
just “what practices are acceptable” but “what is the most appropriate accounting in the
circumstance;” that client accounting positions are not brought before the SEC until that
consultation has taken place; and that full information about the facts and circumstances
has been made available to the national technical office.
Third, an SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin encourages registrants to discuss accounting
questions with the Commission’s staff. When a company does so, the SEC’s reaction
should not be antagonistic if the position is reasoned, even if the Commission’s staff takes
issue with the registrant’s proposed solution to the problem. The SEC staff reported to us
that meetings with registrants are professional and nonconfrontational. Subjecting those
registrants at a later time to public criticism is counterproductive.
Fourth, if a company follows an unusual industry accounting practice or the minority
practice from among a range o f acceptable alternatives, special scrutiny by the auditor and
the board is essential, as is clear disclosure.
And, finally, changed economic or business circumstances can call into question the
ongoing appropriateness o f a long-standing accounting practice. Special scrutiny by the
auditor and the board is warranted.

The “More Broadly Applicable” Accounting Issues
Cited by the Chief Accountant
The Chief Accountant’s January 1994 speech cited several other “more broadly
applicable” cases o f questionable accounting practices, including funded catastrophe
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covers, out-of-date discount rates to measure pension and medical obligations, and
accounting for investments in debt securities. The Panel is not convinced that the “right
answers” to these accounting questions were as obvious as implied. Further, the Panel
notes that the matters had been addressed and resolved by the standard setters prior to
January 1994 and that their characterization as “questionable” was with the benefit o f
hindsight. Therefore, the Panel sees little benefit from its delving further into these issues.

Cheerleading for Clients
Mr. Schuetze’s speech also expressed concern that CPAs may have become cheerleaders
for their clients on the issue o f accounting for stock-based compensation. Elsewhere in
this report the Panel has expressed its thoughts on matters o f client advocacy.
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